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EARNED SOVEREIGNTY:
THE FUTURE OF SOVEREIGNTY-BASED
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
PAUL R. WILLIAMS*
INTRODUCTION
In the coming decades, the world is likely to see continuing conflict
arising from the inherent tension between self-determination and
territorial integrity. In the 1950's and 1960's, the world grappled with
a wave of new states emerging from decolonization. In the 1990s and
2000's, the world witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Sudan, as well as the separation of
Eritrea from Ethiopia and East Timor from Indonesia. In the 1990's,
almost half of all peace agreements failed within five years. In the 21st
century, 90 percent of civil wars occurred in countries that had already
endured civil war within the last 30 years. As we look toward the
horizon, it is safe to say that deep-seated tension will continue to exist
between groups seeking to exercise their right to internal or external
self-determination, and states looking to preserve their territorial
integrity. While some of these conflicts may play out peacefully, we
know from experience that the clash between self-determination and
territorial integrity leads in most cases to violence met by violence.
If the lessons of the past few years are any indication, it is also
likely that the conflict resolution approach of earned sovereignty will be
turned to as a means for bridging the impasse between self-
determination and territorial integrity. Earned sovereignty is the
conditional and progressive devolution of sovereign powers and
authority from a state to a substate entity under international
supervision. The approach, which has its roots in the Northern Ireland
and Bougainville peace agreements, among others, proved successful in
structuring the separation of Montenegro from Serbia, East Timor from
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Relations at American University. He is also the co-founder and President of the Public
International Law & Policy Group, a global pro bono law firm providing assistance to
parties engaged in peace negotiations and drafting post-conflict constitutions. PhD
Cambridge, JD Stanford Law School, AB UC Davis. Dr. Williams is grateful for the
assistance of Colleen (Betsy) Popken for her help with the researching and drafting of this
article.
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Indonesia, Kosovo from Serbia, and South Sudan from the Sudan.
Professor Ved Nanda's lifetime of work on the question of self-
determination played a crucial role in the development of the approach
of earned sovereignty.
During the course of advising numerous states and substate
entities on questions of self-determination, I have invariably turned to
the ideas and concepts developed by Professor Nanda. Professor Nanda
has led the field in proposing specific criteria for resolving claims of self-
determination. He has always resisted the temptation to adopt a
"sovereignty first" or "'self-determination first" approach. Rather, he
has endeavored to paint a realistic picture of the effect that sovereignty-
based conflicts have on the stability of our world, and to identify ways
in which these conflicts may be better resolved.
This article will first discuss the significant impact that Professor
Nanda's scholarship has had on the self-determination debate, setting
the stage for the development of earned sovereignty. Next, it will trace
the development of the earned sovereignty approach to its current
status as a widely accepted conflict resolution approach that has been
extensively utilized to resolve sovereignty-based conflicts throughout
the world. This article will then revisit the elements that make up the
earned sovereignty approach and will analyze the successful use of the
approach to resolve the conflicts in Kosovo and South Sudan.
SETTING THE FOUNDATION FOR EARNED SOVEREIGNTY
Professor Ved Nanda first staked a role in the self-determination
debate in the early 1970's when he wrote about East Pakistan's right to
self-determination.1 In that first piece, Professor Nanda argued that a
set of criteria for self-determination should be developed, and he
proposed a basic set of elements to jump-start the discussion. 2 At that
time, he urged that claims to non-colonial self-determination were going
to rise quickly and sharply, and that the international community
would be wise to consider certain of these claims. 3 When Professor
Nanda later looked back on the East Pakistani conflict, which had
resulted in the birth of Bangladesh, he again argued for the extension of
1. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law-The Tragic Tale of Two
Cities-Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 321
(1972).
2. Id. at 336 (arguing that the following factors made self-determination applicable
to East Pakistan: (1) the large distance between East and West; (2) the deprivation of
human rights to the majority; (3) the ethnic, linguistic, and cultural differences; (4) the
economic exploitation of East Pakistan by West Pakistan; (5) the fact that there had been
a majority determination by vote of the political direction of Pakistan, which had been
forcibly denied; and (6) West Pakistan did not depend upon East Pakistan for its political
or economic viability).
3. Id. at 322.
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self-determination to groups "deprived of the opportunity to participate
in the value processes of a body politic." 4 He reasoned that the test for
evaluating a claim for self-determination should be "the nature and
extent of the deprivation of human rights of the subgroup making the
claim."5
When Professor Nanda revisited self-determination in the early
1980's after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese
intrusion in Cambodia, it was to refine the circumstances under which
secession, as an exercise of the right to self-determination, might be
considered justifiable. 6  To establish whether a right to secede is
legitimate, Professor Nanda suggested focusing on the nature of the
group seeking self-determination and its alienation from the "body
politic," as well as the group's reasons for wanting to secede and the
degree to which its members had been denied basic human rights.7 His
purpose in doing so was to encourage the establishment of criteria for
cases in which the severe deprivation of human rights leaves no
alternative to secession.8
Over a decade later, Professor Nanda reexamined self-
determination in light of the post-Cold War environment, which
included self-determination claims from the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey,
the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and claims for secession in the Balkans,
Caucuses, and throughout Africa. 9 This time around, he analyzed self-
determination in a world that had finally caught on to what he had
insisted for over two decades - that certain claims for self-
determination outside the colonial situation deserve recognition. 10
While Professor Nanda reiterated that the severe deprivation of human
rights may justify self-determination claims, he emphasized that there
were different results of accepting such claims - "the creation of a state,
a federal entity . . . a confederation of states," or "an ethnic power-
sharing arrangement."'1 In order to avoid a resort to violence to resolve
self-determination claims, Professor Nanda encouraged the creation of
mechanisms for pursuing self-determination claims and reconciling
competing claims of sovereignty.12
4. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Outside the Colonial Context: The Birth of
Bangladesh in Retrospect, 1 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 71, 93 (1978-1979).
5. Id. at 85.
6. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to
Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 257, 265 (1981).
7. Id. at 275.
8. Id. at 280.
9. Ved P. Nanda, The New Dynamics of Self-Determination: Revisiting Self-
Determination as an International Law Concept: A Major Challenge in the Post-Cold War
Era, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 443, 444 (1997).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 452.
12. Id.
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In the 21st century, Professor Nanda again lent his expertise to the
self-determination debate in light of Quebec's claim to secede from
Canada, and the recent developments in Kosovo and East Timor. 13 He
argued that the cases of Kosovo and East Timor demonstrated that the
international community may be willing to accept unilateral secession
claims in exceptional circumstances, particularly when an
..undemocratic, authoritarian regime" has prohibited "the 'people' [from]
participat[ing] effectively in the political and economic life of the state"
and has followed "a pattern of flagrant violations of human rights."1 4
A GROTIAN MOMENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DENVER COLLEGE OF LAW
In seeking to develop the ability of lawyers to add value to
sovereignty-based conflicts, Professor Nanda accepted an offer by the
Public International Law & Policy Group to cooperate in organizing a
day-long roundtable discussion at the DU College of Law to exchange
ideas on the evolving conflict resolution approach of earned sovereignty.
At that time, earned sovereignty was an emerging concept with
origins in the peace agreements relating to the state practice of Serbia
and Montenegro and East Timor, the Northern Ireland and
Bougainville agreements, and the proposed agreements for the
Palestine Road Map and Western Sahara. However, despite the ad hoc
reliance on the earned sovereignty approach by mediators and parties
to conflict, there had been little effort to synthesize the concept or draw
attention to its utility for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. 15 This
roundtable, and the subsequent debate that ensued, 16 began to put flesh
on this emerging trend we dubbed "earned sovereignty," which came to
be recognized as the conditional and progressive devolution of sovereign
powers and authority from a state to a substate entity under
international supervision.
13. Ved P. Nanda, Holland and Hart Private International Law Award: Self-
Determination and Secession Under International Law, 29 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 305
(2001).
14. Id. at 325.
15. Earned sovereignty first appeared under the name "intermediate sovereignty" in
a 1998 memorandum issued by the Public International Law & Policy Group and the
International Crisis Group as a proposed solution to the conflict in Kosovo. See
International Crisis Group, Intermediate Sovereignty as a Basis for Resolving the Kosovo
Crisis, Europe Report Noo46 (Sept. 11, 1998), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/
europe/balkans/kosovo/046 -intermediate-sovereignty- as -a-basis-for-resolving-the-kosovo-
crisis.aspx.
16. See Paul R. Williams, Michael P. Scharf & James R. Hooper, Resolving
Sovereignty-Based Conflicts: The Emerging Approach of Earned Sovereignty, 31 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 349, 353 (2003); Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Road to
Resolving the Conflict Over Kosovo's Final Status, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 387, 390
(2003); Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 373, 374-75 (2003).
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Much has changed since that roundtable discussion a decade ago:
the concept of earned sovereignty has gained considerable traction in
the public international law and conflict resolution communities, and -
most significantly - earned sovereignty has proven itself as a reliable
mechanism for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. Earned sov-
ereignty is no longer an "emerging approach," as my colleagues and I
once described it; it is now a tried and tested process for resolving
conflicts.
The earned sovereignty approach has now been fully realized in
both Kosovo and South Sudan, ending years of armed conflict in those
states. Additionally, earned sovereignty has been proposed by the Moro
in the Philippines,17 the Tamils in Sri Lanka,18 and the government of
Nagorno Karbaugh, 19 as an option for ending conflict and resolving
their claims to self-determination.
17. The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) that was
signed by the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) in Kuala Limpur on August 5, 2008, utilized the earned sovereignty approach in
an attempt by negotiators to end the protracted conflict between MILF and government
forces in the Mindanao area. However, the Philippine Supreme Court enjoined the
agreement upon petition from a Christian political leader who claimed they were not
represented in negotiations; after that decision, the government backed away from the
agreement. The MOA-AD outlined the stages of earned sovereignty, and called upon the
parties to later sign a "comprehensive compact" that would guide the transition period.
See Eliseo "Jun" Mercado, MOA-AD, Quo vadis?, AUTONOMY & PEACE REV., July-Sept.
2008, at 9, 10-11 (2008), available at http://www.iag.org.ph/cgi-bin/publications/files/
Volume%204%20Issue%2ONo.%203.pdf (describing earned sovereignty as "the new
paradigm as used in negotiation with MILF, beginning in December 2006" and explaining
the steps of earned sovereignty as outlined in the MOA-AD). For a full text of the MOA-
AD, see Collective, GRP-MILF Full Text of Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) MOA,
PINOY PARA SA KALIKASAN (blog) (Aug. 16, 2008, 7:13 AM), available at http://usap
angkalikasan.multiply.com/journallitem55/GRP-MILFFull Text-ofBJE MOA-AD. For
further discussion by Musib M. Buat, a member of the MILF Peace Panel, on the MILF's
continued pursuit of earned sovereignty, see Darwin Wally T. Wee, MILF Still Upbeat on
Peace Accord Despite Serious Hitches, ZABIDA, Oct. 9, 2009, available at
http://www.zabida.com.ph/component/content/ article/186?ed=16.
18. A statement made by the political wing of the LTTE just before the 62nd General
Assembly of the UN alluded to the notion of earned sovereignty: "[WNe urge the
international community to provide appropriate opportunities to the Tamil people to
express their aspirations, as have been given to the people of East Timor and Kosovo."
Tamil sovereignty, basis of peace talks - LTTE, TAMILNET (Sept. 24, 2007, 5:37 PM),
http://www.tamilnet.comlart.html?catid=13&artid=23362. U.S.-based Tamil legal adviser
Visuthanathan Rudrakumaran has said that "leaving the options of 'earned sovereignty,'
.phased out sovereignty,' and 'conditional sovereignty' off the negotiation table will reduce
the incentive for the Sinhala Nation to put forward a meaningful power-sharing proposal
or even to take the peace process seriously." Earned Sovereignty: East Timor, Kosovo ...
Sri Lanka?, DEFENCEWIRE (Sept. 28, 2007, 12:11 AM), http://defencewire. blogspot.com/
2007/09/earned-sovereignty-east-timorkosovosri.html.
19. See PUBLIC INT'L LAW & POLICY GRP. AND NEW ENGLAND CTR. FOR INT'L LAW &
POLICY, THE NAGORNO KARABAGH CRISIS: A BLUEPRINT FOR RESOLUTION 25 (June 2000),
132 VOL. 40:1-3
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Earned sovereignty has also gained significant traction in the
public international law and conflict resolution communities as a
method for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. While one scholar has
hailed earned sovereignty as the "most promising solution in ethnically
based conflicts where the prerequisites for self-determination are not
met,"2 0 others have described the advent of earned sovereignty as a re-
conceptualization of sovereignty as a divisible entity, calling into
question the strength of traditional notions of sovereignty and self-
determination.2 1 Some scholars focus on earned sovereignty's utility for
resolving conflictS22 or value as a tool to clarify the transition process, 23
while others focus on the connection the approach draws between
dispute resolution and international territorial administration. 2 4 Still
others, in seeking to improve upon the method for resolving conflicts,
highlight potential dangers of the earned sovereignty approach,
including the possibility of withholding power for too long, the need for
"ownership" over the process in order to achieve sustainable peace, and
the necessity for achievable standards with a clear endpoint. 25 This last
point has received particular attention - and criticism - in the Kosovo
context. 26
Moreover, many scholars have thoroughly analyzed the application
of earned sovereignty to the "standards before status" policy approach
available at http://www.nesl.eduluserfiles/file/center%/20for%/20international%/201aw%/20
and%20policy/nagorno.pdf.
20. Karin Oellers-Frahm, Restructuring Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Model with Pit-Falls,
in MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 179, 223 (Armin Von Bogdandy,
Rudiger Wolfrum, Christiane E. Philipp, eds., 2005).
21. Kathleen Clausson & Timothy Nichol, Reconstructing Sovereignty: The Impact of
Norms, Practices and Rhetoric, 10 BOLOGNA CENTER J. OF INT'L AFF. 21, 29 (2007),
available at http://bcjournal.org/storage/BCJ-2007edition.pdf; Joseph Camilleri,
Sovereignty Discourse and Practice - Past and Future, in RE-ENVISIONING SOVEREIGNTY:
THE END TO WESTPHALIA? 33, 40 (Trudy Jacobsen et al. eds., 2008).
22. Nathan P. Kirschner, Making Bread from Broken Eggs: A Basic Recipe for
Conflict Resolution Using Earned Sovereignty, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 1131, 1136 (2007)
(discussing how exactly earned sovereignty can help to resolve conflicts: "sharing
sovereignty fosters dialogue between key stakeholders"; "institution building fosters
competence in the substate entity and provides both the stakeholders and the
international community with assurance of future competency"; and "determining final
status of the substate entity . . . gives the parties an idea of an ultimate reward, a goal
that parties can attempt to obtain. . . . [T]he optional elements . . . keep the parties on
track by rewarding them for tasks accomplished during the implementation process.").
23. Jilrgen Friedrich, UNMIK in Kosovo: Struggling with Uncertainty, in MAX
PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW, supra note 20, at 225, 291.
24. RALPH WILDE, INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION: How TRUSTEESHIP
AND THE CIVILIZING NATION NEVER WENT AWAY 270 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
25. Friedrich, supra note 23, at 291-92.
26. See, e.g. Bernhard Knoll, From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and the
Problem of an International Administration's Open-Ended Mandate, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L.
637, 641 (2005).
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in Kosovo, 2 7 and others have evaluated its application to Bosnia,28
South Sudan, 29 Bougainville,30 Aceh, 31 and East Timor. 32 Still others
have argued for its potential to resolve other conflicts by applying the
approach to the Kashmir people, 33 the Kurds in Iraq, 34 the ethnic
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, 35 and the Abkhaz in Georgia.36
EARNED SOVEREIGNTY IN A NUTSHELL 37
Earned sovereignty, as developed in state practice over the last
decade, seeks to bridge the approaches of sovereignty and self-
determination by providing a mechanism whereby some substate
entities may be guided through a process of transition to statehood or
heightened autonomy in such a way so as not to undermine the
legitimate interests of parent states and of the international
community. Earned sovereignty is designed to create an opportunity
for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts by providing for the managed
devolution of sovereign authority and functions from a state to a
substate entity. 38 In some instances, the substate entity may acquire
sovereign authority and functions sufficient to enable it to seek
international recognition, while in others the substate entity may only
acquire authority to operate within a stable system of heightened
autonomy. The approach seeks to promote peaceful coexistence
27. See RALPH WILDE, supra note 24, at 238; Karen Heymann, Earned Sovereignty for
Kashmir: The Legal Methodology to Avoiding a Nuclear Holocaust, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
153, 174 (2003).
28. See Karen Heymann, Earned Sovereignty for Kashmir: The Legal Methodology to
Avoiding a Nuclear Holocaust, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 153, 186 (2003).
29. Kirschner, supra note 22, at 1142-50.
30. Id. at 1152-58.
31. Id. at 1158-66.
32. Heymann, supra note 28, at 179-80.
33. Id. at 195-97.
34. Philip S. Hadji, The Case for Kurdish Statehood in Iraq, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 513, 534 (2009).
35. See INT'L CRISIS GRP., NAGORNO-KARABAKH: A PLAN FOR PEACE, EUROPE REPORT
No167 4, 13 (Oct. 11, 2005), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/caucasus/
azerbaijan/167-nagorno-karabakh-a-plan-for-peace.aspx.
36. INT'L CRISIS GRP., ABKHAZIA TODAY EUROPE REPORT No176 3 (Sept. 15, 2006),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/europe/176_abkhazia-today.ashx (follow link to
Full PDF report) (The Abkhaz believe that they are currently earning their sovereignty.).
37. This section draws heavily from the following articles: Paul Williams & Francesca
Jannotti Pecci, Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty & Self-
Determination, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 347 (2004); Williams, Scharf &. Hooper, supra note 16;
Williams, supra note 16, at 388-89.
38. Williams, Scharf & Hooper, supra note 16, at 350 ("The authority and functions
may include the power to collect taxes, control the development of natural resources,
conduct local policing operations, maintain a local army or defense force, enter into
international treaties on certain matters, maintain representative offices abroad, and
participate in some form in international bodies.").
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between a state and a substate entity by establishing an equitable and
acceptable power sharing agreement; it is not intended solely to
promote self-determination claims.
As a conflict resolution approach, earned sovereignty has developed
as an inherently flexible process implemented over a variable time
period. This approach is defined by three core elements: (1) shared
sovereignty, (2) institution building, and (3) a determination of final
status. The process may also encompass three optional elements: (1)
phased sovereignty, (2) conditional sovereignty, and (3) constrained
sovereignty. These optional elements are employed to tailor the earned
sovereignty approach to the unique circumstances of the conflict and to
the particular needs of the parties. The state and substate entities
almost always adopt the elements of earned sovereignty by mutual
agreement, but in some cases the international community may support
or initiate one or more of the elements of earned sovereignty against the
preferences of the state or substate entity.
Shared Sovereignty: Each case of earned sovereignty is
characterized by an initial stage of shared sovereignty, whereby the
state and substate entity may both exercise some sovereign authority
and functions over a defined territory. Sometimes international
institutions may also exercise sovereign authority and functions in
addition to, or in lieu of, the parent state. In rare cases, the
international community may exercise shared sovereignty with an
internationally recognized state. In almost all instances, an
international institution is responsible for monitoring the parties'
exercise of their authority and functions.
During the initial stage of shared sovereignty, a provisional
framework may be created within which states, substate entities, and
international organizations share sovereign authority and functions. If
managed constructively, shared sovereignty affords a cooling-off period
during which central authorities and aggrieved people can each
continue to pledge fidelity to their own, mutually incompatible final
aims, while initially suspending violence. The framework for shared
sovereignty may vary according to the duration of the sharing period,
the substantive division of authority, the parties involved, and the goals
to be addressed.
Frequently, shared sovereignty may provide the substate entity
with substantial elements of self-government, so as to considerably
lessen the interest in outright independence and eliminate the causes of
conflict through some form of perpetual autonomy. The period of
shared sovereignty may also be designed merely as a way station to
independence, with the substate entity exercising nearly all the power
and authority of an independent state and equally sharing any
remaining authority.
2012 135
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Institution Building: During the period of shared sovereignty, prior
to the determination of final status, the substate entity, frequently with
the assistance of the international community, undertakes to construct
new institutions for self-government or to modify those already in
existence. The substate entity also works with the international
community to develop the institutional capacity for exercising increased
sovereign authority.
Because functioning democratic institutions are considered the
most effective guarantee to prevent renewed conflict in the long term,
promoting the development of democratic institutions has become an
essential element of modern peace building. In the short term,
institution building is intended to create the capacity for the
assumption of sovereign authority and the functions necessary for the
establishment of an autonomous entity, or a future independent state.
This process usually begins during the initial period of shared
sovereignty and may be addressed by a range of domestic and
international actors.
Determination of Final Status: The eventual determination of the
final status of the substate entity and its relationship to the parent
state is also an essential element of earned sovereignty. In many
instances, the status will be determined by a referendum. In others, it
may involve a negotiated settlement between the state and substate
entity, often with international mediation. Invariably, the
determination of final status for the substate entity is conditioned on
the consent of the international community in the form of international
recognition.
Phased Sovereignty: The first optional element is phased
sovereignty. Phased sovereignty involves the measured devolution of
sovereign functions and authority from the parent state or international
community to the substate entity during the period of shared
sovereignty and prior to the determination of final status. The
accumulation of sovereign authority and functions may be correlated
with the ability of the substate entity to assume these powers, as a
reward for responsible state behavior, or a combination of the two.
Depending upon the nature and characteristics of the conflict, it
may not always be possible to achieve even preliminary power sharing
arrangements. Thus, to enhance the relationship between shared
sovereignty and institution building, some earned sovereignty
agreements have incorporated the element of phased sovereignty.
Phased sovereignty can be useful to promote a smooth transition in
those contexts where the adversarial claims of the parties do not allow
for immediate devolution of powers. The timing and extent of the
devolution of authority and functions may be correlated with the
development of institutional capacity and/or conditioned on the
VOL. 40:1-3136
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fulfillment of certain benchmarks, such as democratic reform and the
protection of human rights.
Conditional Sovereignty: The second optional element is conditional
sovereignty. Conditional sovereignty may be applied to the
accumulation of increased sovereign authority by the substate entity, or
it may be applied as a set of standards to be achieved prior to the
determination of the substate entity's final status. These benchmarks
vary depending on the characteristics of the conflict and generally
include conditions, such as protecting human and minority rights,
halting terrorism, developing democratic institutions, instituting the
rule of law, and promoting regional stability. In most cases, the
relationship between the attainment of certain benchmarks and the
devolution of authority is not automatic - it is subject to evaluation by a
monitoring authority that often involves international institutions.
Such evaluation allows for a margin of discretion to determine when
and how to successfully push forward the process of devolving
authority.
Constrained Sovereignty: The third optional element, constrained
sovereignty, consists of applying limitations on the sovereign authority
and functions of the new state. Constrained sovereignty is often
required as a guarantee for the parent state and the international
community. For instance, the new entity may be placed under a
continued international administrative and/or military presence, or its
sovereign authority may be limited with respect to the right of
undertaking territorial association with other states. Because the
emergence of new states may be destabilizing to the immediate region,
the sovereignty of the new state may sometimes be constrained by the
international community. This threatening destabilization results
either because the state, even after a lengthy period of institution
building, remains incapable of exercising effective authority, or because
the new state's existence in and of itself creates a destabilizing political
dynamic.
Monitoring Implementation: Frequently during the process of
earned sovereignty, a monitoring mechanism is established to build
confidence among the parties, to ensure coordinated implementation of
the relevant agreement, to monitor compliance, and to assist in the
resolution of any disputes. Although not a substantive component of
the earned sovereignty approach, the establishment of credible
monitoring mechanisms can often be a critical procedural element in
safeguarding the legitimacy and effectiveness of the approach.
EARNED SOVEREIGNTY IN PRACTICE
Kosovo: Kosovo is a recent case of the successful application of
earned sovereignty to resolve a sovereignty-based conflict. Kosovo also
represents the most comprehensive example of the use of the optional
2012 137
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element of phased sovereignty to manage the devolution of sovereign
authority and functions. The Balkans had endured ten years of
regional conflict and violence instigated by Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic when NATO airstrikes began in Kosovo on March
24, 1999. After a number of failed negotiated settlements between the
warring parties, the United Nations Security Council adopted
Resolution 1244 (1999) on June 10, 1999, which set the groundwork for
the earned sovereignty of Kosovo. 39 Subsequent to Resolution 1244, the
United Nations endorsed a Provisional Constitutional Framework for
Kosovo, which provided that both the UN Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK")
and Kosovar entities would exercise most of the functions typically
associated with an independent state. 40
Resolution 1244 essentially followed the basic elements of earned
sovereignty: it displaced Yugoslav sovereignty, created mechanisms for
establishing democratic self-government and the protection of minority
rights, and mandated the resolution of Kosovo's final status. Resolution
1244 provided that the UN initially would assume control of sovereign
functions and negotiate a constitutional framework, and then begin the
transfer of sovereign functions to Kosovar institutions. Simultaneously,
the UN was mandated to pursue a resolution of the final status of
Kosovo. However, despite a robust mandate, the UN made sluggish
progress and hesitated in transferring substantial sovereign
responsibility to the Kosovars and pursuing a resolution of Kosovo's
final status.
In 2005, the UN Secretary General appointed former President of
Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, as special envoy to work toward a settlement
on Kosovo's status. 41 Ahtisaari conducted direct negotiations with both
Kosovo's and Serbia's negotiation teams from February to September
2006.42 The negotiations culminated in Ahtisaari's Comprehensive
Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, 43 a plan to protect minority
populations and achieve stable and peaceful independence in Kosovo. 44
39. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
40. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, On a Constitutional Framework
for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, ch. 1, art. 1, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9
(May 15, 2001), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg09-01.htm
(last visited Nov. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Constitutional Framework] (noting that initially
nearly all the authority and functions were designated "reserved competencies" that
remained with United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)).
41. Kosovo's Independence, INT'L CRISIS GRP., http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/key-
issues/kosovos-independence.aspx (last updated Feb. 2009).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Bureau of European & Eurasian Affairs, Summary of the Comprehensive Proposal
for the Kosovo Status Settlement, U.S. DEP'T ST. (Jan. 20, 2009), http://www.state.
gov/p/eur/rls/fs/101244.htm.
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In April 2007, Ahtisaari submitted his plan to the Security Council.45
The plan proposed Kosovo's independence, with continued international
supervision and support,46 while focusing on "protecting the rights,
identity and culture of Kosovo's non-Albanian communities, including
establishing a framework for their active participation in public life." 4 7
The plan called for: (1) a multi-ethnic democracy protected by the
constitution, (2) protection of minority rights and participation, (3)
establishment of an impartial and professional justice system, (4)
protection of refugee rights, and (5) economic development and
security.48 The plan also requested the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to assist in the plan's implementation. 49
Kosovo declared its independence on February 17, 2008, honoring
the Ahtisaari plan's recommendations.5 0 As planned, UNMIK's power
dramatically diminished following Kosovo's independence, and the
Kosovo government has since increased control over state functions.51
Serbia, which intended to retain Kosovo, opposed Kosovo's declaration
of independence 52 and sponsored a General Assembly resolution to
submit the question of the declaration's legality to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).53 As a result, the ICJ issued an advisory opinion
finding that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate
international law, or Resolution 1244.54 Currently, over 70 states
recognize Kosovo's independence,55 including the United States,56
United Kingdom,57 France,58 and Turkey.59
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Kosovo's Independence, supra note 41.
52. Id.
53. U.N. News Centre, Kosovo's Declaration of Independence Did Not Violate
International Law - UN Court, U.N. NEWS SERVICE (July 22, 2010), http://www.un.org
/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=35396&Cr=kosovo&Crl=&Kwl=kosovo&Kw2=independen
ce &Kw3.
54. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 141, 84 (July 22).
55. The World Factbook: Kosovo, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html (follow "Introduction" hyperlink)
(last updated Nov. 4, 2011).
56. Background Note: Kosovo, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (NOv. 16, 2011),
http://www.state.gov/r/paleilbgn/100931.htm.
57. UK to recognise independent Kosovo - PM, NUMBER10.GOV.UK (Feb. 18, 2008),
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.numberl0.gov.uk/Pagel4594.
58. Country Files: France and Kosovo, FRANCE DIPLOMATIE (Feb. 3, 2011)
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files_156/kosovo_6154/france-and-kosovo_6155/
index.html.
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The newly independent Kosovo is a case of successful earned
sovereignty, though the process was not without difficulties,
particularly the slow transfer of powers from UNMIK to Kosovar
authorities and institutions and the lack of an initial timeframe for a
referendum. Despite Kosovo's newly-won statehood, Serbian defiance
persists. For instance, in May 2008, Serbian areas of Kosovo held their
own local Serbian-only elections, despite UNMIK's admonition against
it.60 Additionally, Serbia continues to support Serbian parallel
institutions in Kosovo, including education, health, and welfare, 61 and
forbids Kosovo Serbs from receiving salaries or any other type of
funding from Kosovo's government. 62
In spite of these problems, the nearly nine-year interim period was
markedly peaceful compared to the decade of violence that preceded
Resolution 1244, and the over three years since independence have seen
relatively little violence.
South Sudan: The new Republic of South Sudan represents the
most recent successful application of an earned sovereignty approach to
conflict resolution. Sudan suffered nearly 50 years of civil war between
the predominantly Arab Muslim North (led by the National Congress
Party (NCP)), and the predominantly Christian and animist black
African South (led by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM)). In 2005, the NCP and the SPLM reached a peace deal with
the encouragement and assistance of the international community, and
signed a number of agreements that form the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA). 63
The CPA provided for a six-year interim period, during which
heightened political autonomy was granted to the South and a few key
border areas, 64 but without an immediate grant of sovereignty or even a
59. Statement of H.E. Mr. Ali Babacan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Turkey, Regarding the Recognition of Kosovo by Turkey, REPUBLIC OF TURKEY MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Feb. 18, 2008), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/statement-of-h-e_-mr_-ali-
babacan_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic--of-turkey_-regarding-the-recognition-
of-kosovo.en.mfa.
60. Kosovo's Independence, supra note 41.
61. Id.; see also Minority Issues, EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR MINORITY ISSUES - Kosovo,
http://www.ecmi-map.com/map/index.php?option=com content&view=category&layout=
blog&id=30&Itemid=58&lang-en (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
62. Kosovo's Independence, supra note 41.
63. Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Sudan-Sudan People's Liberation Movement,
Jan. 9, 2005, available at http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/
General/cpa-en.pdf The CPA consisted of the Machakos Protocol Power-Sharing Section,
a Wealth-Sharing Section, sections on the three key border areas (Abyei, Southern
Kordofan, and Blue Nile), a Security Arrangements Section, and a Ceasefire Agreement.
Id.
64. Machakos Protocol, art. 2.2, July 20, 2002, available at http://unmis.unmissions
.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf.
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guarantee of sovereignty at the end of the interim period. The CPA
recognized the rights of the Southerners to govern the affairs of their
region, and also participate in the National Government located in the
North. 65
During the interim period, the CPA provided for the South to
operate its own government, the Government of Southern Sudan, and
gave the substate entity the authority to operate with increased
autonomy. While the new Southern government was still accountable
to the Government of Sudan in the North, it had its own legislature,
executive, and judiciary. 66  The CPA also provided the South with
autonomy through institutions parallel to entities in the National
Government, 67 and the parties committed to forming an independent
Assessment and Evaluation Commission with representatives from the
North, South, and international community to monitor the
implementation of the agreement. 68 However, the Government of
Southern Sudan did not acquire powers equivalent to that of a
sovereign state, as it could not seek international recognition or enter
into international agreements, 69 and it was still subject to Sudan's
ultimate sovereign authority.
The CPA recognized the right of the Southern Sudanese to self-
determination, which would be exercised through a referendum vote
near the end of the interim period on whether the region would remain
a substate entity within the greater Sudan, or attain sovereignty as an
independent state. 70 The international community supported the full
implementation of the CPA, including the provision on self-
determination, with only a few states expressing concern about the
impact secession may have on other self-determination movements in
Africa and worldwide. The Government of Southern Sudan held its
referendum beginning on January 9, 2011, with elections observers
from the South, North, and the international community. When the
results of the referendum were released on February 7, 2011 with an
overwhelming majority in favor of independence, the Government of
Sudan was one of the first states to recognize the results and indicate
its support for a sovereign South Sudan. At the end of the interim
65. Id.
66. Protocol Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement on Power Sharing art. 3, May 26, 2004, available at http://www.goss
mission.org/goss/images/agreements/power sharing.pdf.
67. These parallel institutions included the Southern Sudan Land Commission, the
Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund, and the Bank of Southern
Sudan. Protocol on Wealth Sharing, Jan. 7, 2004, http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/
UNMIS/Documents/General/cpa-en.pdf.
68. Machakos Protocol, supra note 64, art. 2.4.1, 2.4.2.
69. This power was allocated to the National Government only. Protocol on Power
Sharing, supra note 66, sched. B.
70. Machakos Protocol, supra note 64, arts. 1.3, 2.5.
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period, the Republic of South Sudan declared independence on July 9,
2011 and became a member state in the United Nations on July 14.71
The newly independent South Sudan represents the successful use
of earned sovereignty, though the process was not without difficulties.
Political relations were tense, particularly in the months leading up to
the referendum, over unresolved issues in negotiations and heated
rhetoric from political leaders. The dispute over the Abyei area remains
unresolved, and the North and the South have recently engaged in
violent clashes in the border regions. 72 The benchmarks delineated in
the CPA's implementation modalities were often missed, and many key
modalities were completed in the final weeks before the referendum or
postponed for later resolution.
Despite these problems, the six-year interim period was
remarkably peaceful in contrast to the decades of violence that preceded
the CPA. The long interim period provided time for both the
Government of Sudan and the SPLM to disengage from active violent
conflict, operate separate governments and institutions and resolve
disputes through negotiations. The CPA itself was founded upon the
consent of both the NCP and the SPLM, and the exercise of self-
determination was not made unilaterally, but through an
internationally-recognized vote. 73  Members of the international
community were involved in numerous processes during the interim
period, increasing the legitimacy of both governments and the secession
process itself, while maintaining pressure on the parties to uphold the
agreement. When South Sudan declared independence on July 9, 2011,
it was not met with renewed civil war or an illegitimate status, but
instead had a quick and peaceful transition to sovereignty.
A BRIGHT FUTURE FOR EARNED SOVEREIGNTY
The conflict resolution approach of earned sovereignty has emerged
as a response to the increasingly limited utility of the "sovereignty first"
and "self-determination first" approaches to resolving sovereignty-based
conflicts. As self-determination movements become increasingly
intertwined with global terrorist networks, and as "local conflicts"
increasingly undermine regional stability, diplomats are in need of a
71. U.N. GAOR, 65th Sess., 108th plen. mtg., at 114, U.N. Doc. 65/308 (July 14,
2011); see e.g. Jeffrey Gettleman, After Years of Struggle, South Sudan Becomes a New
Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/worldlafrica/10
sudan.html?pagewanted=all.
72. Sudan: Abyei at a Dangerous Tipping Point, INT'L CRISIS GROUP (May 8, 2011),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/201 1/africa/sudan-abyei-at-
a-dangerous-tipping-point.aspx.
73. Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead, INT'L CRISIS
GROUP (Mar. 31, 2006), http://protection.unsudanig.org/data/south/CPA/ICG%/ 20-
%20Sudan%20CPA-The%2OLong%2ORoad%2OAhead%20(MarO6).pdf.
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larger tool kit of approaches for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts.
Moreover, as international human rights norms take on increasing
salience, governments, pushed by public opinion, are less willing to
permit sovereignty-based conflicts to be resolved through the
unrestrained use of force, which frequently leads to massive human
rights violations. The earned sovereignty approach has now been
utilized to successfully resolve a number of sovereignty-based conflicts
around the globe. Professor Nanda's lifetime of contribution to the
comprehensive understanding of the principle of self-determination has
played a key role in the successful development and application of the
conflict resolution approach of earned sovereignty.
